Under a new flag? Defining citizenship in New Caledonia by Maclellan, Nic
Under a new flag?  
defining citizenship in new caledonia
nic 
maclellan 
Discussion  
Paper 2010/2
State, Society and Governance in Melanesia
School of International, Political and Strategic Studies 
State Society and
Governance in Melanesia
DISCUSSION PAPER
THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY
French Constitution, which states that France 
is an ‘indivisible republic’ and ensures ‘the 
equality of all citizens before the law, without 
distinction of origin, race or religion’.
In spite of these principles, the May 
1998 Noumea Accord includes the creation 
of a New Caledonian ‘citizenship’, as a 
legal mechanism to allow positive discrimi-
nation for the indigenous Kanak people and 
other long-term residents of New Caledo-
nia, against French soldiers, public servants 
and other workers on short-term contracts 
who mostly vote against independence. As 
detailed below, New Caledonian citizens are 
given certain privileges—in voting, employ-
ment and economic rights—that are not 
available to all French nationals who are liv-
ing in the islands.
Other articles by the author have highlight-
ed the broader process of inter-communal 
reconciliation underway in New Caledonia, 
seeking to transcend the violent clashes of 
the mid-1980s and build a ‘common destiny’ 
for all communities in New Caledonia.3  
This paper focuses on debates about New 
Caledonian citizenship over the last decade, 
at a time when the islands are moving closer 
In October 2009, the French government 
launched a ‘grand debate on national iden-
tity’. Through the Ministry of Immigration and 
National Identity, the government set up a 
website asking ‘For you, what does it mean 
to be French?’.1 
This initiative sought community perspec-
tives on citizenship in an age of globalisation 
and migration into Europe from Africa, the 
Maghreb and Mashreq. It also came at a 
time when France, Belgium and Switzerland 
were engaged in debates over Islam and 
the banning of the burqa, hijab and mosque 
minarets. 
But this debate over nationality, identity 
and citizenship also raises significant issues 
for people living in France’s overseas depen-
dencies. What does citizenship mean for 
people in the Pacific islands colonised by 
France—New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna 
and French Polynesia?
Under its constitution, France has only 
one category of citizenship, unlike other 
European Union (EU) members that have 
variegated citizenship for people living in 
their overseas territories.2 This reflects the 
core principle set out in Article 1 of the 1958 
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to a decision on their final political status, 
and the Kanak independence movement 
is still seeking the transfer of full political 
sovereignty from France to an independent 
nation—Kanaky. The paper also outlines 
some of the special rights attributed to the 
indigenous Kanak people; details a series 
of legal and political challenges to a more 
restrictive notion of citizenship; and describes 
how new voting rights were entrenched into 
French law in the dying days of the Chirac 
presidency.
A central theme throughout the paper is 
the way that a number of key conservative 
politicians have attempted to move away 
from the commitments they made in signing 
the Noumea Accord. Their ongoing vision 
of New Caledonia as an integral part of the 
French republic may scuttle attempts to build 
a ‘common destiny’ between the indigenous 
Kanak population and those recognised as 
the ‘victims of history’, the descendants of 
convicts, settlers and immigrant workers who 
have made New Caledonia their home.4 
Religion, nationality and citizenship
Conservative leaders like France’s President 
Nicolas Sarkozy have long sparked public 
debate over citizenship and national iden-
tity. As Interior Minister in 2004, Sarkozy 
introduced a ban on the wearing of hijab or 
other distinctive religious symbols in public 
schools. As President, his 2009 proposal to 
ban the wearing of the burqa in public has 
raised concern and anger amongst many 
French citizens of Muslim heritage and belief, 
as well as people who see the debate as a 
diversion from the core economic and socials 
problems facing the county.
The French government’s latest ‘national 
identity’ initiative was denounced by many 
commentators as a cynical political manoeu-
vre in the lead up to the 2010 regional 
elections (where Sarkozy’s Union pour un 
Mouvement Populaire (UMP) party lost many 
seats to the Socialist Party opposition). Crit-
ics have described it as a crude attempt at 
capturing part of the electorate that supports 
the extreme right-wing Front National (FN), 
by stigmatising African and Muslim migrants 
and refugees.5  
As Australia has seen in recent years, 
debates over national identity soon come 
down to defining the rights and responsi-
bilities of citizens, and whether all residents 
are living in ‘one nation.’ The furore over 
‘What does it mean to be French?’ highlights 
an ongoing debate within France over the 
resilience in the 21st century of so-called 
‘national values’: republicanism, secularism 
and the revolutionary trinity of Liberty, Equal-
ity and Fraternity.
As France’s Overseas Minister Yves Jego 
argued in a 2008 speech to New Caledonia’s 
Congress:
Our France is not a race, not a land, not 
the colour of one’s skin. Our France is 
something that men around the world 
aspire to—the universal quest for lib-
erty, equality and, let us not forget, 
fraternity. Our France, it’s a nation 
without parallel, which has known how 
to enlighten the world with its brilliance 
and bring together in its melting pot so 
many different men and women.6 
However, for a country with a long and 
ongoing colonial tradition, national pride in 
liberty and equality takes on a particular 
irony for colonised peoples in the French 
empire.
French traditions of republicanism, secu-
larism and separation of church and state 
sometimes fit awkwardly in the Pacific islands. 
Secularism has been challenged in these 
strongly Christian nations: article 3 of the 
1961 statute establishing Wallis and Futuna 
as a French overseas territory protects the 
rights of the Catholic Church over education, 
clergy and social issues in this overwhelm-
ingly Catholic society. (This protection of one 
church is unique in France’s overseas pos-
sessions.) In Tahiti, pro-independence politi-
cians from the Tavini Huiraatira party caused 
a stir when they came into office in 2004 and 
proceeded to erect a large crucifix on the wall 
behind the speaker’s chair in the local parlia-
ment, scandalising the French High Com-
missioner. Critics of French nationalism have 
highlighted the Republic’s ongoing support 
for the three kings of Wallis and Futuna—an 
irony for the nation that marks the fall of the 
Bastille as its national holiday.7 
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destiny and could become a nationality 
at the end of the Agreement’s period 
of application, should it so be decided. 
During this period, the concept of 
citizenship justifies the restrictions 
applied to the electorate both for elec-
tions to the country’s institutions and 
for the final referendum. This concept 
will also be referred to in the drawing 
up of regulations aimed at protecting 
local employment opportunities.10 
The Noumea Accord was accepted in 
a national referendum in July 1998, and 
entrenched in the French Constitution after 
the passage of specific legislation in March 
1999.11 A new section of the French Consti-
tution was added following the 1998 referen-
dum, and Article 77 now gives the authority to 
the local legislature in Noumea to determine 
regulations covering citizenship, voting rights 
and access to employment in New Caledonia 
(though the French Council of State or other 
relevant French tribunals has to approve the 
‘laws of the country’ proposed in the local 
Congress).
The issue of citizenship in New Caledo-
nia is complex, both politically and legally. 
Firstly, New Caledonia’s political settlement 
has created sui generis decisions in French 
jurisprudence, which do not apply in other 
French ‘collectivities’ (the latest term used for 
France’s overseas colonies). Secondly, EU 
law is evolving on the rights of residents in 
the overseas territories of EU member states. 
Finally, New Caledonia’s status as a non-
self-governing territory recognised by the UN 
Special Committee on Decolonisation raises 
important questions of international law. 
For legal scholars, New Caledonia holds a 
unique situation under the French constitution:
While a New Caledonian citizenship 
was created in 1998 by agreement 
between the French and New Caledo-
nian representatives, this local status 
is superimposed on the French citizen-
ship that New Caledonians possess 
and therefore is concurrently held 
with their French nationality. The 1998 
Agreement, however, acknowledges 
that the New Caledonian citizenship 
might form the basis for a New Cale-
The notion that French citizenship exists 
‘without distinction of origin, race or religion’ 
has been most sharply challenged in the 
islands of New Caledonia. As this paper will 
detail, the Noumea Accord, a political settle-
ment which ended the violent conflict of the 
1980s in the Melanesian nation, saw the cre-
ation of a distinct New Caledonian citizenship 
for long term residents of the islands. 
This settlement reflected a compromise 
between the interests of Kanak nationalists 
seeking political independence from France, 
and those of long-term residents of Euro-
pean, islander or Asian heritage who make 
up the majority of the population after 157 
years of colonisation, settlement and ongoing 
immigration. At the last New Caledonian cen-
sus which recorded people’s ethnicity, held in 
1996, Kanaks made up 44.1 per cent of New 
Caledonia’s inhabitants, followed by Euro-
peans (34.1 per cent) and Wallisians (9 per 
cent). Other officially designated communities 
(Indonesian, Tahitian, Vietnamese, ni-Vanu-
atu) each made up less than 3 per cent.8 
The 1988 Matignon–Oudinot Accords 
ended the period of armed conflict between 
supporters and opponents of independence 
in 1984–88, but a decade later most leaders 
agreed on the need for a new agreement to 
avoid a referendum on independence that 
could tip the country back into violence. 
The Noumea Accord—signed on 5 May 
1998 by the French government, anti-inde-
pendence politicians and the independence 
coalition Front de Libération Nationale Kanak 
et Socialiste (FLNKS)—maps out a transition 
over 15 years (1999–2014), involving the 
transfer of powers from Paris to Noumea, 
the creation of new political institutions, mea-
sures of economic and social ‘rebalancing’ 
and then the scheduling of three referenda 
after 2014 to determine New Caledonia’s 
final political status.9 
The Noumea Accord places special rec-
ognition on the rights of the indigenous 
Kanak population and other New Caledonian 
citizens. Article 2 of the agreement states:
One of the principles of the political 
agreement is the recognition of a citi-
zenship of New Caledonia. This citi-
zenship reflects the chosen common 
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donian nationality in the future and 
will reflect the international status of 
New Caledonia at that time. For the 
moment though, France has certain 
international responsibilities towards 
New Caledonian French nationals.12
In spite of the fact that key principles of 
the Noumea Accord are now constitution-
ally entrenched, the exact definition of this 
citizenship has been the subject of legal and 
political dispute for over a decade. Aggrieved 
French voters and academic pundits have 
also argued that the restrictions discriminate 
against constitutional guarantees of univer-
sal rights for all French nationals.13 There 
have also been complex debates over how to 
determine the starting point for the years of 
residency needed to gain citizenship.
Melanesian or Kanak?
Conservative politicians in New Caledo-
nia have often celebrated the multi-ethnic 
nature of the society. During the 1980s, anti- 
independence leaders like Jacques Lafleur 
criticised the pro-independence FLNKS as 
racist, given its overwhelming membership 
from the indigenous Kanak population and 
its call for Indépendance Kanak et Socialiste 
(IKS). In contrast, the anti-independence 
RPCR party was celebrated as a multi-racial 
formation, linking Europeans, Melanesians, 
Wallisians, Chinese, Vietnamese and other 
communities (the use of ‘Melanesian’ instead 
of ‘Kanak’ is usually a quick way of determin-
ing someones political affiliations!).
But indigenous Kanaks face social, eco-
nomic and political discrimination under 
France’s colonial rule. From 1887 until 1946, 
Kanaks could not vote and suffered under 
the native affairs system known as the 
Indigénat.14 Kanaks only obtained the vote 
after the Second World War, after commu-
nist activists started agitating in the tribal 
reserves and indigenous soldiers returning 
from European battlefields began petitioning 
for civil rights:
We ask to be liberated from an outdated 
regime, which is all too often oppres-
sive and unjust, and which tends to 
keep us in a subordinate position.15 
From post-war involvement in church-
based political associations to the creation of 
the Union Calédonienne (UC) party in 1953, 
indigenous leaders began to engage in local 
political institutions. By the 1970s, a renais-
sance of Kanak nationalism and growing 
support for independence was based upon 
a recognition and valorisation of cultural 
identity for the indigenous community. As 
vividly described by independence leader 
Paul Neaoutyine, young activists from the 
Foulards Rouges took up the pejorative 
French term Canaque (Kanaka) with pride, 
replacing ‘Melanesian’ with ‘Kanak’.16 Former 
seminarian Jean-Marie Tjibaou promoted 
Kanak identity at the Melanesia 2000 festival 
in 1975.17 
Today, the Noumea Accord explicitly 
recognises ‘the Kanak people’ as distinct 
from ‘the French people’ and talks of ‘the 
country’ (le pays) rather than ‘the territory’ (le 
territoire). It also attributes certain rights to 
Kanaks that are not available to other New 
Caledonian citizens. 
A central distinction between the indig-
enous people and other New Caledonians is 
the relationship to the land. As Article 1.4 of 
the Noumea Accord states:
Every Kanak’s identity is defined 
primarily with reference to an area 
of land … . Customary land must be 
surveyed and registered so that 
customary rights over any piece of land 
can be clearly identified … .  Land reform 
will be continued [and] all land will 
henceforth be either customary land or 
land held under ordinary civil law.
Beyond recognition of customary land 
rights, the Accord involves other measures 
that recognise indigenous Kanak culture and 
identity, including:
• the creation of a 16-member Senate for 
Kanak customary chiefs, which must be 
consulted on issues that affect Kanak 
identity (such as questions of land tenure). 
The Senate includes two representatives 
from each of New Caledonia’s eight 
customary regions: Hoot Ma Whaap; 
Paicî-Cèmuhî; Drubéa-Kapumë; Ajië-Arhö; 
Xârâcùù; Iaai; Drehu; Nengone.
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• agreement that the boundaries of the 
communes (municipal councils) should 
be able to take the customary region 
boundaries into consideration (1.2.2)
• the role of the customary authorities in the 
prevention of social ills and mediation in 
criminal sentencing will be acknowledged 
(1.2.4)
• sites that are sacred in the Kanak tradi-
tion will be identified and legally protected 
(1.3.1)
• the State will facilitate the return to New 
Caledonia of Kanak cultural material 
located in museums and collections in 
France (1.3.2)
• Kanak languages, together with French, 
are languages of education and culture in 
New Caledonia: their place in school cur-
ricula and in the media should therefore 
be increased (1.3.3)
• scientific research and university courses 
on Kanak languages should be organised 
in New Caledonia (1.3.3).
For the FLNKS, the provisions of the 
Noumea Accord are part of a process of self- 
determination and decolonisation. The Nou-
mea Accord preamble explicitly states that:
Colonisation harmed the dignity of the 
Kanak people and deprived it of its iden-
tity … . These difficult times need to be 
remembered, the mistakes recognised 
and the Kanak people’s confiscated 
identity restored, which equates in its 
mind with a recognition of its sover-
eignty, prior to the forging of a new sov-
ereignty, shared in a common destiny. 
Decolonisation is the way to rebuild a 
lasting social bond between the com-
munities living in New Caledonia today, 
by enabling the Kanak people to estab-
lish new relations with France, reflect-
ing the realities of our time.
This recognition of the Kanak people as 
a colonised people contrasts with the legal 
treatment of other oppressed peoples in the 
French Republic. No other overseas depart-
ment or collectivity has the same transition 
to a referendum on sovereignty and no other 
colonised people is recognised as a distinct 
people or nation in French law. For example, 
in 1991 the French Constitutional Court 
rejected the notion that the Corsican people 
can be seen as distinct from the French 
people, ruling:
The reference by a legislator to the 
‘Corsican people, component of the 
French people’ is contrary to the Con-
stitution, which only recognises the 
French people, made up of all French 
citizens without distinction due to 
origin, race and religion.18 
Counting ethnic communities
Issues of cultural identity are still controver-
sial in New Caledonia, in spite of political 
changes since the 1980s. After the 1996 cen-
sus highlighted that the Kanaks had become 
a minority in their own land, New Caledonia’s 
population census scheduled for 2003 was 
postponed for 18 months due to this politi-
cally sensitive question of ethnicity. 
Previous censuses in 1989 and 1996 had 
included questions to determine people’s 
ethnic origins: question six asked which 
ethnic community you belong to, and ques-
tion seven asked Kanaks about their tribal 
membership. Such questions can provide 
valuable data: for example, about how many 
Kanaks have moved from rural provinces to 
the capital city, or about different employment 
rates amongst the local communities, or the 
number of migrants arriving from France or 
Wallis and Futuna. 
However, the 2003 census was postponed 
after French President Jacques Chirac’s July 
2003 visit to New Caledonia, when he criti-
cised official census questions about ethnic-
ity as ‘irresponsible and illegal’. President 
Chirac stated the French republic does not 
recognise people on the basis of their ethnic 
origins, saying: ‘There is only one reply to 
such a question, you are all French and there 
are French people of all ethnic origins’.19
The census finally proceeded in late 2004 
without the two contested questions, but 
there was a significant boycott—some esti-
mates suggest 10 per cent of the population 
refused to complete the census forms. For 
this reason, the Government of New Cale-
donia organised a further census in July–
August 2009, which did include the questions 
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on ethnicity. While some preliminary data 
from the census was released in late 2009, 
the results of questions on ethnicity from this 
latest census have not been released as of 
mid-2010, even though they will provide evi-
dence for ongoing debates about citizenship, 
identity and ethnicity.
restrictions on Voting
For the Kanak independence movement, 
the issue of electoral reform has been one 
of their key concerns for the two decades 
after the conflict of the 1980s. Ever since the 
late Jean-Marie Tjibaou negotiated the Mati-
gnon Accord in 1988, independence leaders 
have called for limitations on voting rights 
for the many French nationals who arrive 
in the territory—especially as these public 
servants, soldiers, retirees and technicians 
overwhelmingly vote for parties opposed to 
independence. 
Since the signing of the Noumea Accord 
in 1998, many of these French nation-
als have contested the agreement which 
outlined new citizenship rights for New 
Caledonians. Thus began a nine-year long 
process to amend voting rights for the new 
local political institutions: three provincial 
assemblies in the North, South and Loyalty 
Islands, and a 54-member Congress and 
11-member multi-party Government of New 
Caledonia.20  
The Noumea Accord and the legislation 
which entrenched it into the French Constitu-
tion established different electoral rolls to be 
used in voting for a range of political institu-
tions: 
•    Elections for French and European insti-
tutions—the French Presidency, the 
National Assembly and Senate in Paris, 
municipal councils, overseas seats in the 
European Parliament—are voted for by 
the full electorate (i.e. all French nation-
als registered to vote in New Caledonia).
•   Voting in elections for the three provin-
cial assemblies and the local Congress 
is restricted to a limited electoral roll of 
New Caledonian citizens, rather than all 
French nationals.
•    The referenda on New Caledonia’s future 
political status, scheduled to be held after 
2014, will involve only those New Cale-
donian citizens resident in the islands 
for twenty years (i.e. arriving before 31 
December 1994). 
To move from the ‘electoral annex’ of 
excluded voters onto the electoral roll for 
the Congressional and Assembly elections 
requires approval of a judge. In March every 
year, a team of magistrates arrives in Noumea 
from Paris to update the electoral roll, mostly 
with young people who reach the age of 18, 
but also people who can show they have 
reached the required number of years of 
residency in New Caledonia. 
For example, in March 2010 the FLNKS 
formally lodged 1,500 cases before the mag-
istrates to assist young Kanaks to obtain 
registration on the electoral role as a citizen, 
making them eligible to vote in assembly and 
Congressional elections. An FLNKS spokes-
person noted: ‘It seems to us important that, 
from the perspective of the looming referen-
dum on self-determination, we should make 
an effort to see that no one is forgotten and 
should help those who get lost in the com-
plexities of these procedures. With most of 
these being young people, it’s also important 
that they can benefit from the provisions of 
the law on local employment, which gives 
advantages to citizens above non citizens.’21 
To vote as a citizen for local institutions, 
the Noumea Accord set out a requirement for 
ten years residency. But the text was unclear 
whether the electoral roll would be ‘frozen’ 
(gelé)—restricted to people with ten years 
residency at the time of the 1998 referendum 
that implemented the Noumea Accord—or 
whether it would be ‘sliding’ (glissant), with 
the ten years’ residency determined from the 
date of the relevant election. 
At heart, the issue was who should vote in 
the 2009 and 2014 Assembly and Congres-
sional elections: people who have been in 
the country before 1988 and their descen-
dants of voting age, or more recent arrivals 
who have landed ten years before the rel-
evant poll (thus arriving before 1999 for the 
2009 elections, or by 2004 for the 2014 elec-
tions). Accepting the more restrictive ‘frozen’ 
definition would mean that in 2009 more than 
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18,000 residents—nearly 12 per cent of the 
electorate—would be ineligible to vote for the 
local institutions.
The interpretation of these qualifications 
remained a sharply contested issue from 1998 
until it was finally resolved in February 2007, 
especially as tens of thousands of people 
have migrated from France to New Caledo-
nia since the signing of the 1988 Matignon– 
Oudinot Accords. The following sections detail 
the legal and political battles which deter-
mined the final outcome on voting rights.
Court overrules key provision
On 15 March 1999, the Conseil Constitution-
nel in Paris (France’s highest constitutional 
court) ruled that all French citizens residing in 
New Caledonia for at least 10 years—what-
ever their date of arrival—would be able to 
participate in provincial elections.22 Angered 
by the removal of a key plank of the Accord, 
the FLNKS leadership threatened a boycott 
of the May 1999 local elections. The boycott 
call was only reversed when the French 
government agreed to amend the French 
Constitution again.
The French National Assembly (on 10 
June 1999) and Senate (on 12 October 
1999) both passed legislation to amend the 
constitution. But to take effect, the amend-
ment had to be passed by two thirds of the 
members of both houses of parliament, in 
a joint sitting of the National Assembly and 
Senate known as the Congress at Versailles. 
The constitutional amendments were there-
fore scheduled for approval during a Janu-
ary 2000 session of this French Congress. 
However, this session was never held, for 
domestic political reasons. For seven years, 
the Chirac government dragged its feet and 
the French Congress was not convened 
again until February 2007.
The long delay angered key indepen-
dence leaders. In 2005, Pascal Naouna, then 
President of the largest pro-independence 
party UC) noted: 
I think the majority of people in the 
country, both Kanak and non-Kanak, 
understand that if this issue isn’t sorted 
out, it could set back the whole Noumea 
Accord process. Today, people are 
seeking calm and serenity, and don’t 
want to go backwards and risk the sort 
of conflict we knew during the 1980s. 
So we said to President Chirac’s advis-
ers: ‘Look out! If for domestic political 
reasons you don’t modify the electoral 
roll or fail to convene the Congress at 
Versailles, you’ll be responsible for a 
setback to the Noumea Accord.’23
As France moved closer to the 2007 
Presidential elections and the end of Jacques 
Chirac’s term of office, there was increasing 
pressure from the FLNKS to finalise the 
changes. UC leader Charles Pidjot noted: 
These electoral reforms are the cor-
nerstone of measures which have kept 
the peace. In 1998, we already made a 
concession when we accepted the inte-
gration of the 8,000 people who arrived 
between 1988 and 1998. Throughout 
the years, Kanaks have suffered under 
colonisation. For us, the freezing of the 
electoral roll is a question of principle 
and of respect for promises that have 
been made.24 
Legal challenges
At the same time that the French government 
had delayed clarifying the voting system, the 
reforms were challenged as illegal by French 
nationals residing in New Caledonia who do 
not meet the requirements of New Caledo-
nian citizenship. In this limbo period, a group 
of French nationals who were excluded from 
the 1998 Noumea Accord referendum (and 
will also be excluded from the referenda 
scheduled after 2014) sought to challenge 
the principle in law. New Caledonians who 
had spent years out of the country also 
sought to clarify the complexities of citizen-
ship requirements.
Some disputes were resolved through 
French administrative law, such as the case 
of Felix Kilikili, who completed national 
service in France from 1993 to 1995, then 
continued to work there until 2001. In May 
2005, the ruling on his case by the Cour de 
Cassation (France’s supreme court for civil 
and commercial cases) clarified citizenship 
rights for people born in New Caledonia 
but living overseas for lengthy periods for 
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education, work or military service.25 
An appeal to the UN Human Rights Com-
mittee was rejected in July 2002, as New 
Caledonia was re-inscribed as a non-self-
governing territory with the UN Special Com-
mittee on Decolonisation in December 1986, 
and restrictions on voting rights were ruled as 
appropriate in the context of a decolonisation 
process.26
As the 1998 referendum and subsequent 
legislation had entrenched the changes in 
the French Constitution, they could not be 
overridden in French law, so a series of liti-
gants took France to the European Court of 
Human Rights. They sought re-instatement 
on the electoral rolls, claiming the French 
government was in breach of article 25 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights by discriminating between French 
nationals. 
However, a January 2005 ruling by the 
European Court of Human Rights in the case 
of Bruno Py v. France rejected claims that 
restricting voting rights for French nationals 
in assembly elections was discriminatory. 
The European Court invoked ‘local realities’ 
in rejecting the complaint, saying that New 
Caledonia’s tormented history and status are 
such that they could justify this doctrine. The 
Court also said the restricting clause in the 
electoral roll ‘could be seen as having been a 
key element to the appeasement of a deadly 
conflict’.27
These legal decisions re-opened the way 
for a final resolution of the vexed question of 
freezing New Caledonia’s electoral body.
Opposition to constitutional change
Finally, in the dying months of the Chirac 
Presidency, the government moved to imple-
ment the law, before the country moved to the 
2007 Presidential elections that saw the elec-
tion of Nicolas Sarkozy, leader of the UMP 
coalition. Given the long delay since they 
were first passed in 1999, the French govern-
ment reintroduced the electoral reforms to 
parliament in late 2006.28  
In the lead up to the National Assembly 
vote on 13 December 2006 and the Senate 
vote on 16 January 2007, there were a range 
of pressures that threatened to derail the pro-
cess of electoral reform:
• splits within France’s ruling UMP party, 
pitting those loyal to President Chirac and 
his Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin 
against supporters of then UMP party 
president, Interior Minister Nicolas Sar-
kozy, the leading conservative candidate 
for the 2007 Presidential elections;
• the Right’s concern not to lose votes to 
the extreme right FN, which has used 
the New Caledonia issue to belabour the 
mainstream conservative parties;
• the reversal of attitudes towards electoral 
reform by the conservative anti-indepen-
dence parties in Noumea, Rassemble-
ment UMP and Avenir Ensemble;
• the establishment of community asso-
ciations amongst French nationals in 
Noumea who stood to lose their vote if 
the Constitution was amended.
As the issue of voting reform was put 
on the electoral calendar in 2006, there 
were clear signs that members of President 
Chirac’s own UMP party were not so enthu-
siastic. Some UMP members raised the pur-
ported concern that the legislative workload 
in the parliamentary calendar was too full to 
prioritise the long-standing commitment to 
sort out New Caledonia’s dispute. Bernard 
Accoyer, president of the UMP group in the 
National Assembly, angered FLNKS leaders 
in October 2006 when he said that ‘there are 
better things to do in this period than hold a 
Congress on this sort of text.’29 
A week before the legislation was put 
before the National Assembly in December 
2006, a fight erupted between UMP par-
liamentarians, pitting supporters of Prime 
Minister de Villepin against Interior Minister 
and UMP president Nicolas Sarkozy. Sarkozy 
announced that he would oppose the legisla-
tion, and at a subsequent UMP caucus meet-
ing ‘one after another, New Caledonia’s dep-
uty Pierre Frogier, then Thierry Mariani, Alain 
Marsaud, Jean-Pierre Soisson and Francis 
Delattre—all long-standing or recent apostles 
of the UMP president—expressed their unam-
biguous opposition to the draft law’.30 
The UMP and other conservative parties 
were also concerned about being outflanked 
in the 2007 legislative and Presidential elec-
tions by the neo-fascist FN. In December 
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2006, Marine Le Pen (Vice President of the 
party, daughter of the FN’s then leader Jean-
Marie Le Pen and co-ordinator of his 2007 
Presidential campaign) made a flying visit to 
Noumea. Marine Le Pen called for a refer-
endum on the issue and encouraged French 
voters in Noumea to write to UMP deputies 
and senators to reject the bill. She stated: 
The process that we see underway 
is a process that clearly involves the 
abandonment of New Caledonia. 
Everything is negotiable except the 
core principles of the Republic. If Par-
liament votes for the freeze, we can 
envisage a situation where we’d call 
for those excluded to cease paying 
their taxes.31 
Debate within New Caledonia
In 1998, businessman Didier Leroux cam-
paigned against the Noumea Accord as 
head of the Alliance Party, and called on 
voters to reject the agreement in the nation-
al referendum. Leroux—a long-time oppo-
nent of Jacques Lafleur—was instrumental 
in founding the new centrist party Avenir 
Ensemble, which came into government 
between 2004 and 2009 after the electoral 
defeat of the Rassemblement. Leroux has 
long been linked with the French conser-
vative Mouvement Démocratique (formerly 
UDF) whereas Jacques Lafleur and his suc-
cessor Pierre Frogier have ties with French 
President Nicolas Sarkozy’s UMP. 
Since 2004, Leroux has moved to support 
the Noumea Accord and its key institutions. 
His change of position reflects the desire of a 
section of the European community to move 
beyond the polarisation of the 1980s: 
If at the time, I was largely critical of 
the provisions of the Noumea Accord 
concerning the electoral roll, it was 
because we felt that the text was not 
clear. Furthermore, the debate on the 
freezing of the electoral roll was far 
from being resolved and still forms a 
stumbling block between the contend-
ing parties. Anyway, an agreement is 
always a collection of concessions, so 
if the European Court had declared 
that this restriction was illegal, we 
would have had a difficult situation to 
manage. This issue is, in reality, very 
important for the pro-independence 
movement.32 
Ironically, the anti-independence Ras-
semblement UMP party, which originally sup-
ported the 1998 Noumea Accord, was now 
vehemently opposed to the electoral reforms 
that are a key plank of the agreement. 
Although it was a signatory to the Accord 
alongside the pro-independence FLNKS, the 
Rassemblement UMP under Pierre Frogier 
began to publicly oppose the idea of a fixed 
electoral body. In August 2005, the party 
even called for a national referendum on the 
issue, which would delay the process until 
after the 2007 Presidential elections when 
their conservative champion Nicolas Sarkozy 
would have replaced President Chirac.
In the lead up to the final implementation 
of electoral reform in 2007, the UMP and FN 
both sought support from the conservative 
European electorate in New Caledonia’s 
Southern Province. The issue of ‘the rights 
of French citizens’ became a rallying cry and 
both parties tried to gain support from the 
community associations which were created 
in Noumea, made up of French nationals who 
would be affected by the changes. These 
people stress the indivisibility of the French 
republic and oppose any affirmative action 
programs that would benefit indigenous and 
locally born New Caledonians.
In Noumea, three community associa-
tions were created to oppose the con-
stitutional change: the Association de 
défense du droit de vote (the Association 
for Defence of the Right to Vote); Asso-
ciation des Français résidents de Nou-
velle-Calédonie (the Association of French 
residents of New Caledonia) and the Union 
des citoyens calédoniens pour le suffrage 
universel (Union of Caledonian citizens for 
universal suffrage). The associations, with 
the active support of Rassemblement and 
FN politicians in Noumea, mounted a public 
campaign to lobby French parliamentarians 
to vote against the changes. In 2005, the 
Association des Français résidents de Nou-
velle-Calédonie argued:
There seems to exist two categories 
of French citizens in New Caledonia, 
those who fully enjoy their civil rights 
and those who contribute to the eco-
nomic life by setting up companies, 
by paying taxes, but who do not have 
the right to express themselves … we 
have perceived a growing animosity 
towards metropolitan French in gen-
eral and against retired French public 
servants in particular. This usually 
translates into verbal abuse, for the 
time being, but we fear this could turn 
into hatred…. There are those who tell 
us ‘go back home if you’re not happy’. 
Our answer to this is that freedom of 
circulation on the national territory is 
still a fundamental right and that we still 
have the right to settle here, provided 
we respect local laws and customs.33 
In the lead up to the May 2009 elections 
for the provincial assemblies and Congress, 
Michel Boyer, President of the Association de 
défense du droit de vote, also denounced the 
electoral reforms as a ‘state scandal for the 
nation that calls itself the homeland of human 
rights’, adding:
Those excluded from the right to vote 
are sacrificial victims created under 
blackmail by threat of violence. On 
the eve of the provincial elections on 
10 May, when we look at the circum-
stances, motives and consequences 
for the freezing of the provincial elec-
toral roll, there is just one sentiment 
for partisans of democracy and funda-
mental rights: absolute disgust.34 
This constituency opposed to electoral 
reform included a layer of retired public 
servants who benefit financially by remain-
ing in France’s overseas collectivities after 
retiring from the civil service. Living so far 
from Paris is regarded as a hardship posting 
for French public servants, who get a range 
of perks and benefits for living ‘on the other 
side of the world.’ These benefits continue 
after retirement—under laws dating from the 
1950s, retiring public servants who remain 
overseas obtained extra funds on top of 
their normal pensions. For the Pacific territo-
ries, this can amount to an extra 75 per cent 
of their normal salary! Many people retire 
in France’s overseas possessions, even if 
they’ve never worked there (in New Caledo-
nia, 83 per cent of the pensioners benefiting 
from this benefit have spent all their working 
life in mainland France.)
For all French overseas territories, the 
number of these retirees has risen from 
9,618 (1989) to 29,861 (2005). In New 
Caledonia, numbers rose from 1,600 (1989) 
to 4,600 (2008). The proportion of New 
Caledonia’s revenues paid for pensions and 
retirees increased 77.5 per cent between 
2000 and 2008. These special benefits cost 
the French government 245 million Euros 
in 2005—where a retired teacher receives 
6,000 Euros a month, a retired colonel 9,000 
Euros and a retired magistrate 10,000 Euros. 
Even Parisian officials realised the system of 
perks and bonuses was getting out of hand. 
For this reason, President Sarkozy moved in 
2008 to change the indexation of pensions 
for overseas public servants, and end many 
of the benefits.35  
Mobilising for and against change
In the days leading up to the Senate vote 
in January 2007, both opponents and sup-
porters of the electoral reforms rallied on 
the streets of Noumea. On 12 January, anti- 
independence activists brought together a 
rally of 1,300 people, calling for ‘defence of 
the right to vote’.36 
The next day, a larger rally supported 
by the pro-independence parties of the 
FLNKS, the Union Syndicale des Travail-
leurs Kanak et Exploitées (USTKE) trade 
union confederation and Kanak custom-
ary and community associations marched 
through the streets, calling on France to ful-
fil its promises. To heighten the significance 
of the date for the largely Kanak crowd, they 
were reminded that the rally fell on the anni-
versary of the death of independence lead-
er Eloi Machoro (gunned down by French 
sharpshooters in 1985). New Caledonia’s 
then Vice-President Déwé Gorodé spoke to 
the rally, challenging those trying to renege 
on earlier promises and saying they will 
have to ‘get used to the idea that there is 
no turning back’.37 
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UC Secretary-General Gerard Regnier 
reinforced the message: 
There are five million French citizens 
who live outside the hexagon [main-
land France]. When they move to 
Canada or the United States, they 
submit to the laws of the country that 
has welcomed them. New arrivals in 
New Caledonia must also understand 
that they’re arriving in a country that 
is undertaking a process of liberation, 
and they can’t demand the same type 
of prerogatives that existed in the time 
of the colonial governors.38 
The centrality of the issue for the FLNKS 
was highlighted by the independence coali-
tion’s former President Roch Wamytan: 
It was over the question of the electorate 
that Jean-Marie Tjibaou and Yeiwene 
Yeiwene were assassinated in 1989. 
This issue is therefore quite capable of 
reawakening the rebellion.39 
In contrast, conservative political leaders 
in New Caledonia again attempted to delay 
the votes in the French parliament in Paris, 
calling for further ‘dialogue’. Long-time anti-
independence leader Jacques Lafleur—now 
head of his own party Rassemblement Pour 
la Calédonie (RPC)—argued that the govern-
ment should delay its introduction. Lafleur’s 
rhetoric escalated as the Senate moved to 
its vote in January 2007, stating: 
After the passage of this law, the 
extremist and racist Melanesians will 
ask for even more, and their demands 
will again put us into a situation of con-
frontation.40 
The conservative Rassemblement UMP 
party led by Pierre Frogier proposed that 
there should be a referendum on the issue 
before the law was adopted. Frogier prom-
ised ‘a fight to the end’ against the ‘iniqui-
tous’ law, adding that: 
This will de-facto install apartheid, a 
two-speed citizenship, a kind of hered-
itary right to vote, a right of the blood 
as opposed to our accepted French 
principle of the right of the soil. No 
one, not even the government of the 
Republic or the National Assembly, has 
the right to re-write history.41 
In a media communiqué issued on the day 
of the National Assembly vote, the Rassem-
blement UMP ‘congratulates Nicolas Sarkozy 
and the Assembly members who support 
him, having clearly taken a position against 
this draft law.’42
These statements were criticised by mem-
bers of pro-independence parties and other 
supporters of the electoral reform, who saw 
these calls for delay as an attempt to defer 
the issue until after the May 2007 French 
Presidential elections, in the hope that the 
election of Nicolas Sarkozy for a five year 
term would kill off the issue once and for all. 
UC leader Bernard Lepeu stated: 
UC calls on the political parties, com-
posed for the most part of members 
who arrived recently or in the past 
as part of the colonial settlement, 
not to contribute to the demise of the 
Noumea Accord, a crucial advance 
which has been hailed by the whole 
world, but which remains fragile. The 
constitutional reforms before us are 
nothing more or less than those that 
were already adopted by the National 
Assembly and Senate in 1999.43
Speaker of New Caledonia’s Congress 
Harold Martin (and president of the anti-inde-
pendence Avenir Ensemble) also attacked 
his former conservative colleagues for these 
last minute delaying tactics: 
It’s time to end this masquerade. Boule-
vard Vauban [the Congress in Noumea] 
is not a playground, nor a tribune for 
the Rassemblement, who made the 
electoral freeze part of their electoral 
campaign and who never would have 
polemicised on this issue if they’d won 
the 2004 elections.44 
In spite of lobbying by key anti-indepen-
dence leaders, Jacques Chirac used his 
remaining authority as outgoing President to 
rally enough support for the measure to be 
adopted at the February 2007 meeting of the 
French Congress at Versailles.45 This more 
restricted definition of citizenship meant a 
new electoral roll was used for the May 2009 
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assembly and Congressional elections, and 
will be used again in 2014. 
In May 2009, some 18,230 people resi-
dent in New Caledonia—11.8 per cent of the 
normal electoral roll—could not vote in the 
local elections, even though they still par-
ticipate in elections for institutions in Paris, 
Brussels and Strasbourg. This restriction 
largely disenfranchises people in Noumea: 
in 2009, only 420 ‘excluded’ voters lived 
in the Loyalty Islands Province and 954 in 
the Northern Province. In contrast, there 
are nearly 17,000 ‘excluded’ voters in the 
Southern Province, where the bulk of the 
European and Wallisian population reside 
(amounting to 16.7 per cent of the southern 
electorate).46 
local emploYment
Beyond voting rights, the other central focus 
of the citizenship debate is employment and 
the promotion of emploi local, or priority for 
New Caledonians in the local labour market. 
The Noumea Accord notes:
The size of New Caledonia and its 
economic and social balances do not 
make it possible to open the employ-
ment market widely, and justify action to 
protect local employment … . In order 
to take into account the limited size of 
the employment market, provision will 
be made to give priority access to local 
employment to persons residing on a 
long-term basis in New Caledonia.
Article 24 of the March 1999 legislation 
implementing the Accord states: 
With the aim of supporting or promoting 
local employment, New Caledonia will 
undertake to implement measures to 
favour the exercise of waged employ-
ment for the benefit of New Caledo-
nian citizens and persons who meet 
the necessary period of residency … .
At the time of the 2004 census, there 
were 80,685 active workforce participants 
and 15,271 unemployed from a population 
of 231,062 (though official French defini-
tions of unemployment do not fully take 
account of indigenous workers engaged in 
subsistence agriculture, fishing and cultural 
work).
Unemployment rates in New Caledonia 
have dropped in the last few years, as 
new nickel processing plants and support-
ing infrastructure are developed at Goro 
in the Southern province and Vavouto and 
Koniambo in the Northern Province. In spite 
of this, the rate of recorded unemployment 
in New Caledonia, at 16.3 per cent, is higher 
than that in France (9.9 per cent), French 
Polynesia (11.7 per cent) or even Wallis and 
Futuna (15.7 per cent). There are significant 
differences in employment rates between 
Noumea and the bush: the 2004 census 
showed unemployment at 11.4 per cent in 
Southern Province, compared to 28.4 per 
cent in the Northern Province and 38.9 per 
cent in the Loyalty Islands, which both have 
a largely Kanak population.47 
Debate over local employment is tied to 
concerns about ongoing migration and settle-
ment from France, which has seen thousands 
of people arrive since the Matignon–Oudinot 
Accords ended the 1984–88 conflict. Cal-
culating population growth through migra-
tion in New Caledonia is difficult, as some 
statistics do not distinguish between French 
nationals and New Caledonian citizens. But 
matching births, deaths and immigration 
figures suggests that the migration balance 
increased by at least 9,091 people between 
the 1989 and 1996 censuses, with another 
6,766 extra people between 1996 and the 
2004 census. Net immigration is estimated 
at about 1,000 people each year since then 
(1,134 in 2007).48  
In August 2009, the FLNKS members 
of the government also drew the public’s 
attention to a draft decree on the arrival and 
stay of EU citizens and members of their 
families, which could give five years visiting 
rights to all EU citizens, with the possibility of 
permanent residency.49 The FLNKS argues 
that France, as the administering power in 
New Caledonia, is in breach of UN resolu-
tions which govern immigration into colonies, 
including UN General Assembly Resolution 
35/118 which states that:
Member States shall adopt the neces-
sary measures to discourage or pre-
vent the systematic influx of outside 
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immigrants and settlers into Territories 
under colonial domination, which dis-
rupts the demographic composition of 
those Territories and may constitute a 
major obstacle to the genuine exercise 
of the right to self-determination and 
independence by the people of those 
Territories.50
The issue of local employment was large-
ly ignored during the first post-Accord gov-
ernment (1999-2004) which was dominated 
by the conservative Rassemblement UMP 
party. The next multi-party government led 
by the Avenir Ensemble party (2004–2009) 
began to address the issue, preparing draft 
legislation that would have restricted low 
level public service jobs to New Caledonian 
citizens, and given priority to them for higher 
level jobs. In November 2005, this draft bill 
was largely rejected by the French Council 
of State (the highest administrative court in 
Paris), saying it breached France’s inter-
national commitments and included issues 
(such as employment of spouses and part-
ners) that had not been considered in the 
Noumea Accord.
A new bill was prepared and passed 
through a series of stages in 2009–10, 
including approval by the Government of 
New Caledonia, New Caledonia’s Economic 
and Social Council, and the French Coun-
cil of State. The new law gives priority 
to both New Caledonian citizens and also 
people who meet certain residency require-
ments; establishes a Commission paritaire 
sur l’emploi local (CPEL), for conciliation 
and standards setting; sets penalties for 
breaches of the law; and establishes a list of 
professions where overseas recruitment can 
be prioritised in the absence of locally trained 
workers.51 
The legislation met with approval from 
most employers and trade unions, although 
the militant USTKE—the second largest trade 
union confederation in the country—contin-
ues to argue that the legislation does not go 
far enough to protect local workers’ rights. 
Interviewed from jail, where he was serving 
a year’s sentence after clashes with French 
police during an industrial dispute, the then 
USTKE President Gerard Jodar noted:
Since civil peace returned to our coun-
try, we have witnessed a growing 
wave of immigration from France. The 
Kanak people and those recognised 
as the victims of history will become 
a minority if nothing is done. We have 
asked for a law to be passed to pro-
tect employment for our population. A 
text was prepared, but it really wasn’t 
strong enough to meet our aspirations. 
When we look at the economic crisis 
which France is undergoing and the 
ease with which those people who get 
off the plane can find work—to the det-
riment of those who are citizens of our 
country—one can only be shocked. You 
know, in the tribes, in the working class 
suburbs, in the squatter settlements of 
Noumea, the capital is called ‘White 
City’ because you only see Europeans 
there. We must halt this immigration, 
which only has the goal of enjoying the 
sun, surf and easy money.52 
Unions and human rights groups argued 
that work culture and industrial relations 
practices continue to discriminate against 
indigenous Kanak workers:
This is one of the most flagrant signs 
that our society is not evolving [accord-
ing to Pacific values]: in the labour law 
which has been transferred to us under 
the Noumea Accord, there isn’t any 
allocation for holidays relating to cul-
tural events (yam festivals, mourning 
ceremonies, customary marriages). It 
is in this domain, precisely where the 
articulation of the two worlds, Western 
and Pacific, is located, that we have 
most clearly failed.53 
Trade unions and pro-independence par-
ties have continued to campaign for restric-
tions on people migrating from France and 
other French overseas possessions, with the 
FLNKS group in Congress abstaining from 
the December 2010 vote on the law and 
lodging a series of amendments to tighten 
enforcement of the employment legislation.54 
During the May 2009 electoral campaign, 
a leading FLNKS activist in the Southern 
province proposed the creation of a New 
Caledonian identity card as a priority for the 
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incoming Congress and government. Sylvain 
Pabouty, a member of the Parti de Libéra-
tion Kanak (Palika) elected to the Southern 
Assembly on the FLNKS ticket, stated:
For the FLNKS, first of all it has to 
do with the introduction of a citizen’s 
identity card, which will give priority to 
citizens in the labour market. The draft 
law on local employment must also 
be improved, especially at the level of 
training local public servants.55
The Noumea Accord has promoted a 
range of training programs for Kanaks and 
other New Caledonians. The Cadre Avenir 
program is a scheme funded 90 per cent by 
the France Overseas Ministry and 10 per 
cent by the local government, where New 
Caledonians receive scholarships to study in 
France or complete vocational and profes-
sional training—in 2008, the program cost 
616 million French Pacific francs (AUD$8.3 
million). But there are also significant imbal-
ances in the training provided by France 
under the scheme. Of the 957 trainees (out 
of 1,106) who have successfully completed 
their Cadre Avenir courses by the end of 
2008, only 2 per cent became self-employed 
entrepreneurs, while 60 per cent took up 
public service positions. 
The number of public servants is slowly 
increasing under the Noumea Accord: by 
December 2009, there were 14,522 per-
manent public servants and 9,016 contract 
workers (with the number of short term 
contract workers increasing 7.4 per cent in 
2008–09).56 This is a reflection of the imbal-
ance of employment opportunities in the 
wage sector in New Caledonia’s distorted 
economy: out of 81,839 workers employed in 
2008, 51,970 work in the services sector, but 
only 2,229 in agriculture and fisheries and 
4,366 in the mining and smelting sector.57 
historY and sYmBols
For many years, 24 September was a day of 
mourning or protest for Kanak nationalists. 
It marks the anniversary of the annexation 
of New Caledonia by France in 1853. By 
order of Napoleon III, Rear-Admiral Février-
Despointes officially took possession of the 
main island Grande Terre, in a ceremony 
near the Catholic mission at Balade: ‘From 
this day forth, this land is French and part of 
its national territory.’
Today, rather than serving as a commem-
oration of France’s ongoing colonial pres-
ence, the Government of New Caledonia is 
seeking to transform the meaning of the day 
into a ‘positive date’, where New Caledonian 
citizens can share their ‘common destiny’.58 
For 24 September 2009, the FLNKS politi-
cal bureau called on ‘all New Caledonians 
to actively participate in a day of citizenship 
organised at the place de Mwâ Kâ’—the gar-
dens near the centre of Noumea where this 
12-metre carved statue has been erected.59 
The day of celebrations was opposed by 
the anti-independence Rassemblement UMP 
which proceeded to organise a ‘Republican 
picnic’ elsewhere in Noumea.
The 2005 dispute over where to locate 
the Mwâ Kâ statue is part of a larger battle 
over memory and identity. With many of the 
streets and parks in Noumea’s central busi-
ness district named after French soldiers 
and politicians or famous military battles, 
independence activists seek to transform the 
colonial era imagery that still dominates the 
country. 
There are many examples of such initia-
tives, which are contested by local conserva-
tive politicians: the updating of the Monu-
ment aux Morts war memorial, to include the 
names of Kanak soldiers who died fighting 
for France in the World Wars; the circulation 
of a petition in October 2009 to remove the 
statue of Admiral Olry from the Place des 
Cocotiers, the central square in Noumea (the 
statue was erected in 1893 to commemorate 
this colonial governor’s victory over Kanak 
tribes during the 1878 rebellion, when Chief 
Atai rose up against the theft of Kanak land); 
or the practice of renaming towns, rivers 
and geographic features that is becoming 
common in the Northern and Loyalty Islands 
provinces (for example, the east coast town 
of Houailou, headed by a Kanak woman as 
mayor, has reverted to the original spelling of 
Wâa wi lûu).
Another central part of this process has 
seen major reforms to the education curricu-
  Under a New Flag? Defining Citizenship in New Caledonia
15
lum, especially in humanities subjects like 
history and geography, to reflect New Cale-
donia’s place as a Melanesian nation in the 
Pacific region.60 As set out in the preamble to 
the Noumea Accord, the French government 
has formally committed to a new reading of 
the islands’ history, as part of the decolonisa-
tion process. Speaking to the Congress in 
Noumea in May 2008, France’s Overseas 
Minister Yves Jego noted:
Through the reconciliation built upon a 
shared historical narrative inscribed in 
the preamble of the Noumea Accord, 
which recognises the precedence of 
the Kanak civilisation and the ‘shock 
of colonisation’, you have opened the 
possibility of a future together. By this 
conjoined recognition of the rights of 
the first inhabitants and the legitimacy 
of the democratic principle based on 
the notion of a New Caledonian citi-
zenship, you have opened the path to 
civil peace.61 
But readings of history are never set-
tled. Australia suffered through ‘history wars’ 
under the government of former prime minis-
ter John Howard, with him criticising a ‘black-
arm band’ version of history.62 In France, con-
servative politicians have also been seeking 
to promote the ‘positive’ aspects of French 
imperialism. Until it was repealed by President 
Jacques Chirac in early 2006 after public pro-
test, a law passed by the conservative UMP 
government on 23 February 2005 required 
high school teachers to teach the positive 
values of colonialism to their students. Article 
4 of the 2005 law required that:
Programs of university research should 
grant the French presence overseas, 
especially in North Africa, the place it 
deserves. Education programs should 
recognise in particular the positive 
role of the French presence overseas, 
especially in North Africa, and grant the 
eminent place that is deserved for the 
sacrifices of combatants in the French 
armed forces who came from those 
territories.63 
In September 2009, the French Com-
munist Party condemned as ‘scandalous 
and intolerable’ the fact that the Academy for 
Overseas Sciences (an arm of the French 
Ministry of Education) still awards an annual 
literary prize for the best work on the ‘positive 
aspects of colonisation.’64 
New Caledonia had its own history wars 
during the mid-1980s, when Kanak and Cal-
doche intellectuals and church leaders began 
to write a people’s history of the islands.65 
Today, there is a flourishing industry in local 
historiography, with greater co-operation 
between people from different communities, 
that has transformed our understanding of 
the French convicts, deportees and Algerian 
rebels who were sent to the antipodes, the 
Kanak and islander soldiers who fought for 
France in the trenches during World War 
One, the trade unions who built the country’s 
nickel industry, the role of communists in the 
Kanak political awakening after 1945 and the 
early church support for Kanak involvement 
in political parties.66
Developing new national symbols
In the multi-party Government of New Cale-
donia, the minister responsible for culture and 
citizenship issues is independence activ-
ist Déwé Gorodé, a noted author, poet and 
teacher and co-founder of the Parti de Libéra-
tion Kanak (Palika – Kanak Liberation Party). 
In contrast to other radical pro-independence 
formations which highlight the rights of the 
indigenous population, key Palika leaders 
have recently been stressing the concept of 
citizenship for all New Caledonians. Gorodé 
argues: ‘People must develop awareness of 
citizenship, they must train themselves in it 
and express themselves about it, in order 
to actively participate in the evolution of 
things’.67
The FLNKS has long argued that chang-
ing attitudes to nationality and citizenship 
must take account of the symbols of nation-
hood: flag, national anthem and other devis-
es. Given the resonance of the Marseillaise 
and the bleu-blanc-rouge tricolour as sym-
bols of French colonialism, many indepen-
dence supporters have also been seeking 
new signes indentitaires or national symbols 
for New Caledonia. 
The need to create new symbols was 
acknowledged in the Noumea Accord, as 
part of the transition to a referendum on New 
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Caledonia’s final political status. Article 1.5 of 
the Accord states: 
The country’s national symbols—
name, flag, anthem, currency, design 
of bank notes—will need to be devised 
in common to express both Kanak 
identity and the future in which all will 
share. The Constitution Act on New 
Caledonia will provide for the possibil-
ity of changing this name by means 
of a law of the country adopted with a 
qualified majority. The country’s name 
may be printed on identity papers as a 
sign of citizenship.
But even after the election of a local 
government in 1999, many politicians were 
reluctant to take up the issue, fearing that 
attempts to design symbols of national unity 
could cause divisions between supporters 
and opponents of independence. Should 
the islands be known as New Caledonia, 
Kanaky or a combination like Kanaky-New 
Caledonia? Should the multi-coloured flag 
adopted by the FLNKS independence move-
ment replace the blue, white and red of the 
French tricolour? Can the new symbols give 
recognition to Kanak identity, but also show 
respect for the European and islander immi-
grants who have made New Caledonia their 
home?
After many years delay, a working group 
was convened on 11 April 2007 by Déwé 
Gorodé as Minister for Culture and Citizen-
ship. Supported by technical experts, the 
committee of political, church, union and 
community leaders began discussing the 
symbols. They launched a competition to 
choose new designs for banknotes, a nation-
al anthem to replace the Marseillaise, and a 
motto to reflect both Kanak identity and the 
multicultural nature of the society. In an inter-
view with the author, Gorodé explained:
We soon came to a consensus on the 
anthem, motto and currency, to reflect 
our Kanak heritage but also the com-
mitment that all members of the com-
munity have made to build a common 
destiny. However we were unable to 
agree on the name of the country and 
the flag, so we’ve put those aside for 
the moment. These two things are 
intensely political, and behind this dis-
cussion lies the fundamental issue of 
national sovereignty.68 
On 26 June 2008 (the anniversary of the 
referendum on the Matignon Accord which 
ended the conflict of the mid-1980s), the 
Government of New Caledonia endorsed 
the motto suggested by Jean-Brice Herren-
schmidt: ‘Terre de Parole, Terre de Partage’ 
(Land of the Word, land of sharing).69 From a 
range of tunes, they chose an anthem ‘Soy-
ons Unis, Devenons Frères’ (Let us be united 
and become brothers), composed by seven 
young members of the Melodia children’s 
choir—the chorus is sung in both French 
and Nengone (the language from the island 
of Mare).
In October 2008, Gorodé travelled to Paris 
to meet with the French Conseil d’Etat, which 
advises the government on administrative 
regulations and laws. On 21 October 2008, 
the French authorities gave the green light 
for New Caledonia’s Congress to consider a 
law adopting the national anthem, motto and 
currency designs.
But these symbols of national unity are 
still a political football. Any law to adopt them 
must be passed by three fifths of the 54-
member Congress. But Pierre Frogier, the 
leader of the conservative Rassemblement 
UMP—the party holding the largest number 
of seats in the current Congress—has stated 
that New Caledonia’s French heritage must 
be honoured. His party abstained when the 
11-member Government of New Caledonia 
voted on the issue in June 2008 and the 
law implementing the new symbols had not 
passed before the May 2009 Congressional 
elections. 
As well as political hurdles, there are also 
a number of practical concerns—is it worth 
printing new banknotes with local designs at 
a time when New Caledonia is considering 
adoption of the Euro as its currency?
The debate over a new name and flag for 
the country is still contentious. 
The Kanaky flag was developed by work-
ing groups of the FLNKS Congress in Sep-
tember 1984, who described the flag as:
… three horizontal bands of which the 
colours are, from bottom to top: green, 
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which represents the land of our 
ancestors, the wealth of the soil and 
hope—the country; then red, which 
symbolises the blood that’s been spilt 
for the struggle, socialism and the unity 
of the people; blue, which represents 
the sky and the Pacific environment, 
the sovereignty of the Kanak nation in 
the Pacific; then towards the flagpole, 
a golden circle which represents the 
sun on which is drawn in black the 
case [traditional hut] with its flèche faî-
tière [totemic ridgepole].70
This flag was first raised on 1 Decem-
ber 1984 at La Conception by then FLNKS 
President Jean-Marie Tjibaou, as the FLNKS 
declared the creation of the provisional gov-
ernment of Kanaky.
This flag remains the central icon of the 
independence movement, as reaffirmed at the 
FLNKS Congress held in December 2009. 
Even so, Palika leader Paul Neaoutyine 
has stated that he hopes there would be a 
new flag before the country hosted the 2011 
South Pacific games, and that the Kanak 
flag would lead the New Caledonian team 
into the stadium: ‘If there can’t be a consen-
sus before that time, Palika asks that we 
display the two flags—the Kanak flag and 
the French tricolour.’71
The conservative Rassemblement UMP 
leader Pierre Frogier, who is President of 
the European-dominated Southern Prov-
ince, expanded the debate over the flag in 
a major speech on 10 February 2010.72 His 
agreement that the flag of Kanaky should 
fly alongside the French blue, white and 
red tricolour outside public buildings and on 
ceremonial occasions sparked widespread 
debate and differing reactions. 
The Kanak Customary Senators issued a 
statement noting: ‘For the Customary Senate, 
there is a pressing need to endow the country 
today with a new name and flag, because the 
young people of our country have a need for 
strong symbols so they can resolutely commit 
within the framework of a new society created 
by the Noumea Accord’.73
The National Front leader Bianca Henin 
denounced the proposal, saying ‘we will never 
accept the flag with the FLNKS colours’. In 
contrast, many independence leaders noted 
that the idea of flying both flags alongside 
each other was not new, and had been 
common practice in the Kanak-dominated 
Northern and Loyalty Islands provinces since 
the late 1980s. Louis Kotra Uregei, President 
of the Parti Travailliste (Labour Party) wel-
comed the evolution of the Rassemblement 
UMP position, but noted: ‘Why have we had 
to wait twenty years?’.
In spite of this political gesture, Fro-
gier was not retreating from his anti-inde-
pendence stance. Purporting to speak on 
behalf of all New Caledonians of European 
heritage, Frogier threw out a challenge to 
the independence movement to explain the 
symbolism of their colours:
We would like the blue, white and red 
flag to continue to fly everywhere in 
New Caledonia, while France retains 
the authority over sovereignty. That 
has always been, remains and will 
always remain my political fight. I know 
that the independence supporters are 
very attached to their flag, which has 
always accompanied them in all their 
fights. For us, we don’t recognise their 
flag. It is for us a symbol of division 
and exclusion, the emblem of violence 
which takes us back to the times of the 
Troubles. It still evokes strong feelings 
of rejection amongst the population, 
especially amongst those who lived 
through this dark period of our recent 
history, and who suffered from it.74 
In reply, Palika leader Paul Neaoutyine, 
President of the Northern Province, stressed 
that the colours of the Kanaky flag have posi-
tive meanings: 
The blue symbolises the future, though 
it’s also the ocean and the sky. The 
green is the colour of hope, though it’s 
also the colour of sustainable develop-
ment, which we all want in a country on 
the move. The red, and I’ve stressed 
this before, because people always 
have the habit of saying it represents 
the blood that’s been spilt, but it’s not 
only blood. In Kanak and islander cul-
ture, relationships are built on ties of 
blood. It’s the blood that is alive, it’s 
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thanks to the mother’s blood that we 
are alive, and all the customary ges-
tures that we make are built on this 
understanding. Then there’s the sun. 
Yes, we want to live under the same 
sun as everyone else. And within the 
sun, there’s the flèche faîtière, the 
totem on a traditional house, which 
represents the identity of people who 
live in a certain place.75
For Déwé Gorodé, there is still hope that 
the issue can be resolved: 
Currently, some town halls fly both the 
Kanak flag and the French flag along-
side each other. Some members of our 
working group have suggested that this 
compromise may be suitable during 
the remaining years of the Noumea 
Accord. For many, the FLNKS flag has 
moved beyond politics—it was carried 
with pride by young New Caledonians 
to greet the Pope [during his 2008 visit] 
in Sydney. But some anti-indepen-
dence leaders still prefer the French 
flag, while other committee members 
want to design a completely new flag, 
drawing on our common heritage. So 
if we continue to work together, these 
symbols will reflect the unity we are 
trying to create in our society.76 
While New Caledonia may soon be sing-
ing a new anthem, the choice of a flag and 
a name for the islands remains elusive. The 
symbols and substance of citizenship in New 
Caledonia are an ongoing arena of struggle, 
as the people of these Pacific islands move 
towards a new political status.
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